Here’s a few of the articles I’ve had published with Middle East Policy:
Wiley Online Library (2020, September 12)
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Lekhraibani, R., Rutledge, E. J. & Forstenlechner, I. (2015). Securing a dynamic and open economy: the UAE’s Quest for Stability, Middle East Policy, 22(2), 108–124. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12132 🗒 Abstract etc.
Giving private sector jobs the required significance; only such a dramatic image makeover can attract more UAE nationals to it
The Federal Authority for Government Human Resources gave research on Emiratisation a boost by launching an annual award for scholarly work on the UAE labour market and human resources. This is a timely incentive because oil prices seem destined to remain some way off on their 2010—14 highs, and comfy government jobs are said to be a thing of the past.
Among the wining studies was one conducted by the UAE University; it was the first large-scale study to investigate the views of UAE nationals working in the private sector and polled 653 individuals. The survey included questions related to job satisfaction and also on context-specific sociocultural sentiments such as the prestige attached to a public sector job.
Indeed the UAE’s labour market’s distortions and segmentations cannot be fully understood, let alone addressed, without such issues being factored into the equation.
The research found that it was “salary and benefits” that most significantly and positively predicted the intention of Emiratis to continue working in the private sector, while “sociocultural influences” — societal attitudes on a given occupation’s prestige and status level — had the most significant negative effect and was likely to deter Emiratis from staying in the private sector.
In other words, money does still talk. However, employee satisfaction isn’t all about money, “training opportunities” and the “nature of job” also writ large. The latter finding is of importance because it implies, at the very least, that today’s graduates do see private sector occupations as more interesting and fulfilling, if compared to the more bureaucratic-style ‘classic’ public sector jobs.
However, as evidenced by the research, it continues to be the case that “classic” public sector positions continue to attract the most status and prestige. This sentiment is even more pronounced among male employees, with male respondents significantly more likely to be adversely affected by sociocultural influences (the pride or prestige attached to public sector positions) and be less happy with the nature (or “environment”) of work in the private sector.
The research has applied policy relevance. The more closely aligned like-for-like public/private sector positions become in terms of salaries, working hours and days of annual leave, the more attractive will be private sector career paths. Such alignment — most likely by way of more extensive subsidies or top-ups for nationals working in the private sector — would help redress the current notion that it is the citizens who’ve secured government jobs that have the higher status. The findings also show that internship programmes — that are now compulsory at some federal universities — are paying dividends and recommends that more interns should be placed in the private sector as about one-third of those surveyed were working for private sector companies where they had completed their internships.
Another revealing find was the fact that almost three-quarters of the sample of UAE nationals employed in the private sector currently had other members of their immediate family working in the same sector. Therefore government policy that champions those Emiratis who take up non-conventional private sector career paths will help change prevailing societal attitudes in relation to what is, and is not, considered a suitable career path for Emiratis.
The study on private sector Emiratisation by Dr Emilie Rutledge and Dr Khaled Al Kaabi recently received the Federal Authority For Government Human Resources Award for the Best Academic Research in HR. Their study is timely in that it considers this topic in an era where comfy government jobs are said to be a thing of the past. In addition to this, their survey-based research—polling 653 individuals—is the first large-scale one to investigate the sentiments of UAE nationals actually working in the private sector. While basing their research on the notions of the Theory of Planned Behaviour and job satisfaction scales, they also factor in what are termed as context-specific sociocultural sentiments. They make the case that the UAE’s labour market distortions and segmentations cannot be fully understood, let alone addressed, without such issues being factored into the equation. As Dr Rutledge says, “employee satisfaction isn’t all about money, the benefits of even the nature of the work and relations with fellow workers, societal attitudes on a given occupation’s prestige and status levels also writ large.” As evidenced by their findings and analysis, it continues to be the case that ‘classic’ public sector positions continue to attract the most status and prestige. This sentiment is even more pronounced amongst the male survey participants.
Another issue that the study highlights is the difficulty face in defining exactly what constitutes the private sector. In a region who’s labour markets are characterised by being highly distorted and segmented along public/private and national/non-national employee lines, the division between public and private entities is often hard to determine. As Dr Al Kaabi explains, it was necessary for their study to include government-backed entities as quasi-private ones as this is what society considers them to be. While some labour market economists would classify these within the government sphere, in the UAE at least, many in this category are commercially-run and, “really do now manage their human resources as if they were genuine private sector operators.”
The study found that it was ‘salary and benefits’ that most significantly and positively predicted continuance intentions (β = .399, p < .001) while ‘sociocultural influences’ most significantly and negatively predicted continuance intentions (β = -.423, p < .001). In other words, money does still talk. These observations also suggest that the more closely aligned like-for-like public/private sector positions become in terms of salaries, working hours and days of annual leave, the more attractive will be the private sector career paths. The authors of this study both contend that such alignment—most likely by ay of public sector pay freezes than pay cuts—would help redress the current notion that it is the citizens who’ve secured government jobs that have the higher status. Other job satisfaction related constructs that had a significant impact on the degree to which individuals planned to continue working in the private sector were: ‘training opportunities’ were a positive factor (β = .163, p < .001) and interestingly, the ‘nature of job’ (β = .072, p .009). The latter finding is of importance because it implies, at the very least, that today’s graduates do see private sector occupations as more interesting and fulfilling (if compared to the more bureaucratic-style ‘classic’ public sector jobs).
In terms of differences between the genders, male respondents were significantly more likely to be adversely affected by sociocultural influences pride (or “prestige) and were significantly less happy with the nature (or “environment”) of work in the private sector. With regard to age, the younger the respondent, the less likely they will be to intend to continue working in the private sector. The study’s authors argue that younger members of society are significantly more influenced by sociocultural barriers and least satisfied with the professional development opportunities on offer. They suggest that this may be due to the fact that they have relatively junior positions at the given private sector organisation. With regard to education, the higher one’s qualification is the more likely it will be that they intend to remain in the private sector. This ties in with the age-related differences, it follows that within the private sector the positions that require post-graduate qualifications will not only pay more but will also have attached to them more status.
Of perhaps most note and applied policy relevance are the following observations. Firstly, no less than one-third of those surveyed were working for private sector entities that they had actually competed their internships with. This suggests that the internship programs that are now compulsory at some federal universities in the UAE are paying dividends. The second observation is that almost three-quarters of the sample (that is UAE nationals employed in the private sector) currently have other members of their immediate family working in the same sector. As Dr Rutledge says, “any government policy that champions those individuals who take up non-conventional career paths will help change prevailing societal attitudes and norms in relation to what are and are not suitable career paths.”
If Gulf citizens are to keep enjoying rich-world standards of living, they will increasingly have to find productive work in the private sector; this means overhauling labour markets that keep too many of the region’s citizens idle
THE people of Saudi Arabia have for decades enjoyed the munificence of their royal family: no taxes; free education and health care; subsidised water, electricity and fuel; undemanding jobs in the civil service; scholarships to study abroad; and much more. This easy life has been sustained by gushers of petrodollars and an army of foreign workers. The only thing asked of subjects is public observance of Islamic strictures and acquiescence in the absolute power of the sprawling Al Saud dynasty.
Similar arrangements hold in the other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), a six-member club of oil monarchies. But these compacts are breaking down. The price of oil has fallen sharply since 2014, and the number of young Gulf citizens entering the job market is growing fast. The maliks and emirs can no longer afford huge giveaways, or to pay ever more subjects to snooze in air-conditioned government offices. The monarchs know it. They say they are seeking to diversify their economies away from oil rents; they are also whittling away generous subsidies and plan a new value-added tax across the GCC.
But reforms have to go further. If Gulf citizens are to keep enjoying rich-world standards of living, they will increasingly have to find productive work in the private sector. That means overhauling labour markets that keep too many of the region’s citizens idle.
The pampering of Gulf citizens has made them expensive for firms to hire (see “Labour laws in the Gulf: From oil to toil”). By contrast, the third-class legal status of many migrant workers makes them extra-cheap (see “Migration in the Gulf: Open doors but different laws”) and puts them at the mercy of their employers. Given the choice between a hardworking foreigner and a costly local, private firms have long preferred the foreigner.
In response Gulf governments have imposed ever more stringent quotas on foreign companies to employ locals, especially in desirable white-dishdasha jobs. In Bahrain 50% of workers in banks must be Bahrainis; but only 5% of those in construction need be. (It’s awfully hot on building sites.) Quotas reduce the incentive for Gulf citizens to do a job well: why bother, when your employer has little choice but to keep you on? Firms often regard hiring locals as a sort of tax. Some pay them to stay at home.
The best policy would be to phase out quotas entirely, while also slimming the bureaucracy and making it clear that civil-service jobs are no longer a birthright. In Saudi Arabia two-thirds of citizens are employed by the state. Public-sector wages account for 12% of GDP in the Gulf and Algeria, compared with an average of 5% across emerging economies.
The way migrant labourers are treated needs to change, too. Gulf states deserve credit for letting in far more immigrants than almost all Western countries, relative to their populations. (In many cases, foreigners outnumber locals.) Migrants gain from earning far higher wages than they could back in India or Pakistan. But the coercive parts of the kafala system of sponsoring foreign workers should be dismantled. Migrant workers should not need their employers’ permission to leave the country. After a while, they should be allowed to switch jobs. Contracts should be clear and enforced by local courts. Long-term foreign workers should be able to earn permanent residence; ultimately those who wish to should have the opportunity to become citizens.
These reforms–less pampering for locals and more rights for migrants–would reshape the labour market. More locals would have to do real work. Migrants would be better treated, though inevitably fewer would be hired. Some new ideas are being tested. Bahrain is allowing firms to ignore quotas by paying a fee for each foreign worker they employ. As part of its ambitious economic agenda, Saudi Arabia is talking of issuing green cards to some migrants.
A new social contract
At a time of bloody turmoil across the Arab world, many royals fear undoing the social compact that has kept them in power. But cheap oil makes change unavoidable; doing nothing merely postpones the reckoning. Economic transformation should nudge Gulf states towards political reform. Perhaps, as their citizens are asked to do more to earn their living, they will demand that rulers do more to earn their consent.
This is the website of Dr Emilie J. Rutledge who, with almost two decades’ worth of experience in managing, designing and delivering university-level economics courses, is currently Head of the Economics Department at The Open University.
erutledge.com
Dr Emilie J. Rutledge
Emilie has published over 20 peer-reviewed papers and is the author of “Monetary Union in the Gulf.” Her current research focus is on employability, the feasibility of universal basic incomes and, the oil-rich Arabian Gulf’s economic diversification and labour market reform strategies. On an ad hoc basis, Emilie provides consultancy on developing interactive university courses, alongside analytical insight on the political-economy of the Arabian Gulf.
