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United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, ‘the UAE,’ or simply ‘the Emirates,’ is at the eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is a federal elective monarchy made up of seven emirates, with Abu Dhabi serving as its capital. The seven Emirates are: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. The UAE shares land borders with Oman to the east and northeast, and with Saudi Arabia to the southwest; as well as maritime borders in the Persian Gulf with Qatar and Iran, and with Oman in the Gulf of Oman.

Maps & Flag

As of 2025, the UAE had an estimated population of 12.2 million, of which just one million were Emiratis. Thus, less than one in ten individuals in the UAE have claims to the country’s sovereign wealth.

Introduction

The UAE economy experienced a significant slowdown to 3.1 per cent in GDP growth in 2023, down from 7.9 per cent in 2022. The deceleration was attributed to weaker economic global activities and a decline in oil production to comply with OPEC+ decisions. As a result, the oil sector has witnessed a contraction of an estimated 2.7 per cent. However, “the non-oil sector, however, remains robust and resilient as growth accelerates to 5.4 per cent, driven by the financial and insurance services, construction, real estate, and wholesale and retail trade sectors” (World Bank, 2024a). The following summary of the UAE’s economy was given by the World Bank in 2024:

The UAE maintains its status as a key regional hub for trade, finance, and tourism, bolstered by substantial progresses in economic diversification and a reduced dependence on hydrocarbon income. Major risks to the outlook include an escalation of geopolitical conflicts, large fluctuations in oil prices, and continued global financing tightening.

In general, hydrocarbon activity remains the primary source of government revenue, but efforts are underway to accelerate the diversification of the economy and of government revenues. These include the introduction of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in mid-2023. The outlook for the non-oil sector is robust, with an anticipated increase in oil sector activity expected to maintain strong external and fiscal positions. Key risks to growth include OPEC+ decisions on quotas, as well as the continuation/expansion of the conflict in the Middle East and its potential impact on oil prices volatility and on the movement of goods and people (not least, tourism). In particular, the disruption of trade routes in the Red Sea have triggered an increase in shipping costs and rerouting, including for Asia-Europe trade. This could negatively impact the transport and logistics sectors, posing potential downside risks to economic growth during 2025.

Political-Economy

According to the EIU (2024) Strong international oil prices have enabled the government of the UAE to continue to invest heavily in improving infrastructure and maintaining targeted social support, housing and employment assistance, and other benefits. In general, a high level of income per head and redistribution of funds between Abu Dhabi and less wealthy emirates in the UAE mean that there are fewer social strains or demands for democratisation than in poorer countries with comparable authoritarian political systems. In the EIU’s annual Democracy Index, the UAE was placed, “firmly in the “authoritarian” category, ranked 125th out of 167 countries and territories. [1]   

As Reporters Without Boarders (Reporters sans frontières, RSF) wrote in 2024, the government of the UAE “prevents both local and foreign independent media outlets from thriving by tracking down and persecuting dissenting voices.” Under a 1980 federal law, UAE authorities can censor media content deemed to be overly critical of policies, the ruling families, religion or the economy. Journalists are also targeted under the 2012 cybercrime law, which was updated in 2021. In addition, spreading “rumours” is punishable by a prison sentence as well as a fine. The National Media Council regulates the media and hunts down content that criticises government decisions or threatens “social cohesion” ­– terms vague enough to include any content that does not conform to government requirements. The National Media Council also examines and sanctions foreign media content, which is subject to national standards.

There is a tradition of loyalty to the House of Nahyan, the UAE’s founding family, that is linked to the country’s historical development and its emergence as an economic power. Any criticism of its members is condemned and seen as a lack of loyalty. This encourages self-censorship. “As soon as they emit the slightest criticism, journalists and bloggers find themselves in the crosshairs of the UAE’s authorities, who are masters of online surveillance. Offenders are usually accused of defamation, insulting the state or spreading false information designed to harm the country’s image. For this, they risk long prison sentences and are likely to be mistreated.”

Freedom House (2024) provides the following summary for the UAE:

Limited elections are held for a federal advisory body, but political parties are banned, and all executive, legislative, and judicial authority ultimately rests with the seven hereditary rulers. The civil liberties of both citizens and noncitizens are subject to significant restrictions.

According to Human Rights Watch (2024), “unjustly convicted and sentenced at least 44 defendants in the second largest unfair mass trial, many of whom had already been serving prison sentences as part of the UAE94 mass trial.” The UAE has promoted a public image of tolerance and openness through hosting events like COP28 while restricting scrutiny of its rampant systemic human rights violations and fossil fuel expansion (Human Rights Watch, 2024). HRW add that the UAE’s kafala (labour sponsorship) system ties migrant workers’ visas to their employers, preventing them from changing or leaving employers without permission:

Employers can falsely charge workers for “absconding” even when escaping abuse, which puts them at risk of fines, arrest, detention, and deportation, all without any due process guarantees. Many low-paid migrant workers were acutely vulnerable to situations that amount to forced labor, including passport confiscation, wage theft, and illegal recruitment fees. Trade unions are not permitted, which prevents workers from collectively bargaining. The UAE still does not have a non-discriminatory minimum wage.

Moreover:

The UAE deploys some of the world’s most advanced surveillance technologies to pervasively monitor public spaces, internet activity, and even individuals’ phones and computers, in violation of their right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and other rights. The authorities block and censor content online that they perceive to be critical of the UAE’s rulers, government, and policies and any topic, whether social or political, that authorities may deem sensitive. The penal code and Cybercrime Law further curtail space for dissent. Article 174 of the penal code stipulates a minimum prison sentence of five years and a minimum fine of approximately $27,000 if the act takes place in “writing, speech, drawing or by statement or using any means of technology or through the media.” Two provisions may directly affect the work of journalists based in the UAE. Article 178 provides for sentences of three to 15 years in prison for anyone who, without a license from the appropriate authorities, collects “information, data, objects, documents, designs, statistics or anything else for the purpose of handing them over to a foreign country or group or organization or entity, whatever its name or form, or to someone who works in its interest.” The Cybercrime Law contains an entirely new section entitled, “Spreading Rumors and False News.”

Graphs & Tables

What follows are a selection of graphs and tables from credible and cited sources. It is worth comparing those on the UAE with those of the other Arabian Gulf countries covered on this site.

RSF contend that it is the right of every human being to “have access to free and reliable information.” The Press Freedom Index, use five contextual indicators for each economy assessed: political context, legal framework, economic context, sociocultural context and safety (whereby a subsidiary score ranging from 0 to 100 is calculated for each indicator):

Press freedom in the United Arab Emirates

United Arab Emirates, 2023 and 2024

Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index analyses the transformation processes toward democracy in transitional economies across the globe. In 2024 it was stated that throughout MENA, “autocratic rule festers” and that MENA’s scores for democracy and the quality of governance are at “all-time lows” and that “the quality of governance is deteriorating, and military forces are gaining power.” The German Non-governmental organisation adds that many countries within this region on “flashy imagery and marketing under the banner of modernisation, rather than making actual progress (BTI, 2024). BTI (2024) also point out that MENA’s scores for democracy and the quality of governance are at an all-time low [and] the quality of governance is deteriorating, and military forces are gaining power. The German NGO adds that many countries rely on “flashy imagery and marketing under the banner of modernisation,” rather than making actual progress.

United Arab Emirates, BTI 2024 scores

“In the United Arab Emirates, the authoritarian policies pursued stand in contrast to the existing liberal and social environment that is prevalent in the country.”
Expand Chart  

UAE’s 2024 BTI matrix:

BTI transformation matrix (2024). Expand Chart  

UAE’s 2022 BTI matrix:

BTI transformation matrix (2022). Expand Chart  

UAE’s 2020 BTI matrix:

BTI transformation matrix (2020). Expand Chart  

UAE’s 2018 BTI matrix:

BTI transformation matrix (2018). Expand Chart  

Fraser Institute rankings

The Fraser Institute’s Human Freedom Index presents a broad measure of human freedom, understood as the absence of coercive constraint.

The United Arab Emirates, Freedom in the World, 2024 scores

Expand Chart  

Freedom House rankings

Freedom House point out that their Freedom in the World annual rankings are “the most widely read and cited report of its kind, tracking global trends in political rights and civil liberties for over 50 years.” They chart Global Freedom scores and Internet Freedom scores for some 210 countries and territories. More latterly, Freedom House have begun to chart Internet Freedom scores (currently 70 countries are tracked, of which three are in the Arabian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).

The United Arab Emirates, Freedom in the World, 2024 scores

 


notes

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Country profile information is compiled from, amongst others, the following sources; a full References list for this page is also given below:

Academic

Cambridge University Press  

Elsevier      JSTOR  

Intellect Discover  

Oxford Academic  

Routledge  

Sage  

Springer  

Media outlets

The Economist Intelligence Unit  

Financial Times  

Middle East Economic Digest  

Organisations

Arab Monetary Fund  

Bertelsmann Transformation Index  

Energy Information Agency  

Energy Institute  

Eurostat  

Fraser Institute  

Freedom House  

International Energy Agency  

International Monetary Fund  

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries  

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  

Reporters sans frontières  

United Nations Development Program  

Varieties of Democracy  

The World Bank  

World Economic Forum  

World Intellectual Property Organisation  

World Trade Organisation  

References

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The Six GCC Economies:

Country Profiles: Bahrain Country Profiles: Kuwait Country Profiles: Oman Country Profiles: Qatar Country Profiles: Saudi Arabia Country Profiles: United Arab Emirates

i This is the website of Dr Emilie J. Rutledge who, with almost two decades’ worth of experience in managing, designing and delivering university-level economics courses, is currently Head of the Economics Department at The Open University.

Emilie has published over 20 peer-reviewed papers and is the author of “Monetary Union in the Gulf.” Her current research focus is on employability, the feasibility of universal basic incomes and, the oil-rich Arabian Gulf’s economic diversification and labour market reform strategies. On an ad hoc basis, Emilie provides consultancy on developing interactive university courses, alongside analytical insight on the political-economy of the Arabian Gulf.

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