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i This is the website of Dr Emilie J. Rutledge who, with almost two decades’ worth of experience in managing, designing and delivering economics courses at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels (Courses), is currently Head of the Economics department at The Open University.

Emilie has published over 20 peer-reviewed papers (Publications) and is the author of “Monetary Union in the Gulf”. Her current research focus is on employability, the feasibility of universal basic incomes and, the oil-rich Arabian Gulf’s economic diversification and labour market reform strategies. On an ad hoc basis, Emilie provides academic consultancy and specialises in developing interactive university courses, alongside analytical insight on the political-economy of the Arabian Gulf.
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Bahrain Demographics
Kuwait Economic diversification
Oman Labour markets
Qatar Macroeconomics
Saudi Arabia Oil-rent
The UAE Political-economy
The Arabian Gulf Socioeconomics
MENA Sovereign wealth

Arabian Gulf data

Information depicted is the latest publicly available as of January, 2025.

References

Baumeister, C., & Kilian, L. (2016). Forty Years of Oil Price Fluctuations: Why the Price of Oil May Still Surprise Us. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1), 139–160. doi:https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.1.139

BP. (2021). Statistical Review of World Energy [Dataset]. Retrieved from: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics.html

Caldara, D., Cavallo, M., & Iacoviello, M. (2019). Oil price elasticities and oil price fluctuations. Journal of Monetary Economics, 103(May), 1–20. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.08.004

EIA. (2024). Real Petroleum Prices [Dataset: U.S. Energy Information Administration]. Retrieved from: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/

OPEC. (2024). Annual Statistical Bulletin. Vienna: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

The Energy Institute. (2024). Statistical Review of World Energy [Dataset]. Retrieved from: https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review/resources-and-data-downloads

Running from taxation


References

Crisp, J., & Corfe, O. (2023, December 9). Inside the luxurious lives of the Russians of Dubai. The Daily Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/12/09/inside-the-luxurious-lives-of-the-russians-of-dubai/

The Economist. (2018, September 27). Sweet deserts. The Economist, 428(9111), 58. https://www.economist.com/international/2018/09/27/how-the-united-arab-emirates-became-an-oasis-for-tax-evaders

Troianovski, A. (2023, March 15). ‘Russia Outside Russia’: For Elite, Dubai Becomes a Wartime Harbor. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/13/world/europe/russia-dubai-ukraine-war.html

Gulf greetings

The Arabian peninsular seeks to become a default holiday destination

As I wrote recently, the UAE is the Middle East’s most popular destination be it as a conference location, convention centre or indeed holiday destination (XX XX). Some 21.5 m tourists visited in 2019 (UNWTO, 2023), a striking number considering that there are only around one million Emirati citizens (see: Arabian Gulf data). The meteoric growth in visitors is largely due to a proactive government strategy of infrastructural investment and destination brand-building (see, e.g., Chen and Dwyer, 2018). As Thani and Heenan (2017) state, in order to attract tourists the UAE has undergone some, “eye-catching transformations.” Notable amongst the cultural zones and theme park hubs are the world’s tallest structure (Burj Khalifa), biggest mall (The Dubai Mall), only seven-star hotel (The Burj Al Arab) and a satellite branch of France’s Louvre museum (Wippel, 2023). State controlled oil rent has facilitated the creation of two of the world’s largest airlines and airport hubs—Emirates and Etihad (DXB and AUH). In terms of marketing the UAE as an “escape to the sun” location, London’s English Premier League football club Arsenal, wear Emirates shirts and play home games at “Emirates stadium;” Manchester City wear Etihad shirts and play their home games at “ Etihad stadium” (Millington et al., 2021).


References

Rutledge, E. J. (2023). The tour guide role in the United Arab Emirates: Emiratisation, satisfaction and retention. Tourism and hospitality research, 23(4), 610–623. https://doi.org/10.1177/14673584221122488

Rutledge, E. J. (2024). The tour guide profession: An attractive option for UAE nationals majoring in tourism? Tourism and hospitality research, 0(online first), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/14673584241278451

The Economist. (2024). Call of the desert. The Economist, 452(9404), 71–72. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/culture/2024/07/04/can-saudi-arabia-become-a-premier-tourist-hotspot

Strong men

Wood, G. (2022, March 3). Absolute Power. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/

Worth, R. F. (2020, January 9). The M.B.Z. Moment. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin-zayed.html

Pelham, N. (2022, July 28). MBS: Despot in the desert. The Economist, 444(9307). Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/1843/2022/07/28/mbs-despot-in-the-desert

Pelham (2022); Wood (2022); Worth (2020)

“Arab Spring” ripples


References

Colombo, S. (2012). The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards. The International Spectator, 47(4), 110–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.733199

Kamrava, M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution. Orbis, 56(1), 96–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2011.10.011

Abouzzohour, Y. (2021, March 8). Heavy lies the crown: The survival of Arab monarchies, 10 years after the Arab Spring. Brookings Doha. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/heavy-lies-the-crown-the-survival-of-arab-monarchies-10-years-after-the-arab-spring/

Bubble, bust, boom

Dubai epitomises the Gulf’s property market. It did suffer a massive correction back in 2009 (Collinson, 2009), the Emirate needed to borrow several billion from Abu Dhabi (Davidson, 2009) but, that debt has been repaid and today the sector is once again booming (Maccioni, 2024).

Only time will tell and history is history (unendingly so). The digitisation of everything is as good as it is bad. One’s predictions and forecasts, with hindsight and internet indexing, can come to be seen as having been too hubristic and/or heuristic.


References

Bloch, R. (2010). Dubai’s Long Goodbye. International journal of urban and regional research, 34(4), 943–951. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.01014.x

Collinson, P. (2009, May 26). Dubai suffers biggest house price slump. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/money/2009/may/26/dubai-property-crash

Davidson, C. (2009). Dubai: foreclosure of a dream. Middle East report, 251(Summer), 8–13. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735295

Maccioni, F. (2024, July 8). Dubai property market stays strong as demand from ultra-rich continues. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/dubai-property-market-luxury-homes-b2575845.html

Renaud, B. (2012). Real Estate Bubble and Financial Crisis in Dubai: Dynamics and Policy Responses. Journal of real estate literature, 20(1), 51–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2012.12090313

The economics (and politics) of oil

First published in:

Academic rigour, journalistic flair


Rutledge, E. J. (2024, July 9). How the economics of oil could sway the US presidential election. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/how-the-economics-of-oil-could-sway-the-us-presidential-election-232956
🖨 Print-friendly PDF


Oil continues to influence global economics and politics like no other finite natural resource. In the 2024 US presidential election, the strategic commodity will be an important domestic issue.

As the biggest producer and consumer of oil on the planet, the US has a particularly strong relationship with the black stuff. And the candidates know it.

Donald Trump has promised to “drill, drill, drill” and reportedly courted the financial backing of industry giants. Those giants have responded by donating US$7.3 million (£5.7 million) to Trump’s campaign – three times more than for his 2020 run.

Meanwhile, Joe Biden has attempted to reduce dependence on fossil fuels with his green energy policy and other legislation. Yet at the same time he has overseen an increase in domestic oil production and promised motorists he will keep petrol prices low.

It’s an important promise in the US, a country whose love affair with cars is well known. Out-of-town shopping malls, long highways and a lack of government investment in public transportation have fuelled car dependency, with many cities being designed around huge road systems.

So it is perhaps unsurprising that pump prices are a significant factor influencing votersResearch has even shown that gasoline prices have an “outsized effect” on inflation expectations and consumer sentiment. As fuel prices go up, confidence in the economy goes down.

And while many European and Asian countries have shifted towards alternative energy sources, the US has not reduced its dependence on fossil fuels when it comes to transport. Electric models make up only 8% of vehicles sold in the US, compared to 21% in Europe and 29% in China.

Any rise in gasoline prices ahead of the US summer “driving season” – when holidays and better weather encourage more road travel and gasoline consumption is estimated to be 400,000 barrels per day higher than other times – would be a serious concern for the Democratic party.

Yet it’s also true that whoever is in the White House actually has limited ability to influence gasoline prices. Around 50% of the pump price is the cost of crude oil, the price of which is set by international markets.

And despite producing enough oil domestically to cover its consumption, the US continues to trade its oil around the world. Back in 2015, Congress voted to lift restrictions on US crude oil exports that had been in place for four decades, allowing US companies to sell their oil to the highest international bidder.

To complicate things further, some US refineries can only deal with a certain type of crude oil, which has to be imported. Neither international events or foreign production decisions are under the control of a US president.

Indeed, oil price spikes caused by political crises in other oil producing regions illustrate how continued dependence on oil itself, whether domestically produced or imported, leaves the US exposed to global market shocks which could in turn influence electoral outcomes.

After Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and production cuts from countries such as Saudi Arabia in 2023, the Republican party used a rise in gasoline prices to attack Biden’s environmental policies which had reduced domestic oil drilling and ended drilling leases in the Arctic.

Big oil, little oil

So while the US president has little say over the price of fuel that voters pay, domestic oil and gas regulations have a role to play, as oil producers make up a significant body of influence in the US.

Aside from the big firms backing Trump, the structure of the US oil industry is unique among oil producing states in that it is dominated by a very large number of small independent producers who earn money from the extraction and sale of oil from their land.

How the economics of oil could sway the US presidential election - Emilie Rutledge, July 9th, 2024
Some campaigners have blamed Biden for price rises at the pump

In most oil-producing countries, subsurface oil is owned by the state. But in the US, the mineral rights are owned by the private landowner who can earn royalties by allowing oil companies to drill on their land. In 2019, there were 12.5 million royalty owners in the US. Operating alongside them are some 9,000 independent fossil fuel companies which produce around 83% of the country’s oil and account for 3% of GDP and 4 million jobs.

Those companies drilling on state-owned land pay a royalty rate to the government, which up until recently was as low as 12.5% of the subsequent sales revenue. Biden’s decision to raise the rate to 16.67% did not go down well with oil producers.

Despite that raise and Biden’s pledge to forge ahead with the US energy transition, the domestic oil and gas industry expansion has continued under his watch. In 2023, US oil production grew to unprecedented levels, averaging 12.9 million barrels per day and forecasters predict a 2% production increase in 2024.

Surging US oil production may help with the Democrats’ re-election bid, but rising gasoline prices will not – even though their levels depend on much more than Biden’s energy policies. Instead, it may be that the international economics of oil markets drive voters’ decisions – and determine who wins and who loses in November 2024.

(Palestine:) The One-State Solution

— Edward Said
January 10th, 1999 © 2024 The New York Times Company.

PDF copy:
Said, E. (1999 Jan 10). The one-state solution. New York Times Magazine, 37-1

Given the collapse of the Netanyahu Government over the Wye peace agreement, it is time to question whether the entire process begun in Oslo in 1993 is the right instrument for bringing peace between Palestinians and Israelis. It is my view that the peace process has in fact put off the real reconciliation that must occur if the hundred-year war between Zionism and the Palestinian people is to end. Oslo set the stage for separation, but real peace can come only with a binational Israeli-Palestinian state.

This is not easy to imagine. The Zionist-Israeli official narrative and the Palestinian one are irreconcilable. Israelis say they waged a war of liberation and so achieved independence; Palestinians say their society was destroyed, most of the population evicted. And, in fact, this irreconcilability was already quite obvious to several generations of early Zionist leaders and thinkers, as of course it was to all Palestinians.

“Zionism was not blind to the presence of Arabs in Palestine,” writes the distinguished Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell in his recent book, “The Founding Myths of Israel.” “Even Zionist figures who had never visited the country knew that it was not devoid of inhabitants. At the same time, neither the Zionist movement abroad nor the pioneers who were beginning to settle the country could frame a policy toward the Palestinian national movement. The real reason for this was not a lack of understanding of the problem but a clear recognition of the insurmountable contradiction between the basic objectives of the two sides. If Zionist intellectuals and leaders ignored the Arab dilemma, it was chiefly because they knew that this problem had no solution within the Zionist way of thinking.”

David Ben-Gurion, for instance, was always clear. “There is no example in history,” he said in 1944, “of a people saying we agree to renounce our country, let another people come and settle here and outnumber us.” Another Zionist leader, Berl Katznelson, likewise had no illusions that the opposition between Zionist and Palestinian aims could be surmounted. And binationalists like Martin Buber, Judah Magnes and Hannah Arendt were fully aware of what the clash would be like, if it came to fruition, as of course it did.

Vastly outnumbering the Jews, Palestinian Arabs during the period after the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate always refused anything that would compromise their dominance. It’s unfair to berate the Palestinians retrospectively for not accepting partition in 1947. Until 1948, Jews held only about 7 percent of the land. Why, the Arabs said when the partition resolution was proposed, should we concede 55 percent of Palestine to the Jews, who were a minority in Palestine? Neither the Balfour Declaration nor the mandate ever specifically conceded that Palestinians had political, as opposed to civil and religious, rights in Palestine. The idea of inequality between Jews and Arabs was therefore built into British, and subsequently Israeli and United States, policy from the start.

The conflict appears intractable because it is a contest over the same land by two peoples who always believed they had valid title to it and who hoped that the other side would in time give up or go away. One side won the war, the other lost, but the contest is as alive as ever. We Palestinians ask why a Jew born in Warsaw or New York has the right to settle here (according to Israel’s Law of Return), whereas we, the people who lived here for centuries, cannot. After 1967, the conflict between us was exacerbated. Years of military occupation have created in the weaker party anger, humiliation and hostility.

To its discredit, Oslo did little to change the situation. Arafat and his dwindling number of supporters were turned into enforcers of Israeli security, while Palestinians were made to endure the humiliation of dreadful and non-contiguous ”homelands” that make up about 10 percent of the West Bank and 60 percent of Gaza. Oslo required us to forget and renounce our history of loss, dispossessed by the very people who taught everyone the importance of not forgetting the past. Thus we are the victims of the victims, the refugees of the refugees.

Israel’s raison d’etre as a state has always been that there should be a separate country, a refuge, exclusively for Jews. Oslo itself was based on the principle of separation between Jews and others, as Yitzhak Rabin tirelessly repeated. Yet over the past 50 years, especially since Israeli settlements were first implanted on the occupied territories in 1967, the lives of Jews have become more and more enmeshed with those of non-Jews.

The effort to separate has occurred simultaneously and paradoxically with the effort to take more and more land, which has in turn meant that Israel has acquired more and more Palestinians. In Israel proper, Palestinians number about one million, almost 20 percent of the population. Among Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which is where settlements are the thickest, there are almost 2.5 million Palestinians. Israel has built an entire system of “bypassing” roads, designed to go around Palestinian towns and villages, connecting settlements and avoiding Arabs. But so tiny is the land area of historical Palestine, so closely intertwined are Israelis and Palestinians, despite their inequality and antipathy, that clean separation simply won’t, can’t really, occur or work. It is estimated that by 2010 there will be demographic parity. What then?

Clearly, a system of privileging Israeli Jews will satisfy neither those who want an entirely homogenous Jewish state nor those who live there but are not Jewish. For the former, Palestinians are an obstacle to be disposed of somehow; for the latter, being Palestinian in a Jewish polity means forever chafing at inferior status. But Israeli Palestinians don’t want to move; they say they are already in their country and refuse any talk of joining a separate Palestinian state, should one come into being. Meanwhile, the impoverishing conditions imposed on Arafat are making it difficult for him to subdue the highly politicized inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank. These Palestinians have aspirations for self-determination that, contrary to Israeli calculations, show no sign of withering away. It is also evident that as an Arab people — and, given the despondently cold peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, this fact is important — Palestinians want at all costs to preserve their Arab identity as part of the surrounding Arab and Islamic world.

For all this, the problem is that Palestinian self-determination in a separate state is unworkable, just as unworkable as the principle of separation between a demographically mixed, irreversibly connected Arab population without sovereignty and a Jewish population with it. The question, I believe, is not how to devise means for persisting in trying to separate them but to see whether it is possible for them to live together as fairly and peacefully as possible.

What exists now is a disheartening, not to say, bloody, impasse. Zionists in and outside Israel will not give up on their wish for a separate Jewish state; Palestinians want the same thing for themselves, despite having accepted much less from Oslo. Yet in both instances, the idea of a state for “ourselves” simply flies in the face of the facts: short of ethnic cleansing or “mass transfer,” as in 1948, there is no way for Israel to get rid of the Palestinians or for Palestinians to wish Israelis away. Neither side has a viable military option against the other, which, I am sorry to say, is why both opted for a peace that so patently tries to accomplish what war couldn’t.

The more that current patterns of Israeli settlement and Palestinian confinement and resistance persist, the less likely it is that there will be real security for either side. It was always patently absurd for Netanyahu’s obsession with security to be couched only in terms of Palestinian compliance with his demands. On the one hand, he and Ariel Sharon crowded Palestinians more and more with their shrill urgings to the settlers to grab what they could. On the other hand, Netanyahu expected such methods to bludgeon Palestinians into accepting everything Israel did, with no reciprocal Israeli measures.

Arafat, backed by Washington, is daily more repressive. Improbably citing the 1936 British Emergency Defense Regulations against Palestinians, he has recently decreed, for example, that it is a crime not only to incite violence, racial and religious strife but also to criticize the peace process. There is no Palestinian constitution or basic law: Arafat simply refuses to accept limitations on his power in light of American and Israeli support for him. Who actually thinks all this can bring Israel security and permanent Palestinian submission?

Violence, hatred and intolerance are bred out of injustice, poverty and a thwarted sense of political fulfillment. Last fall, hundreds of acres of Palestinian land were expropriated by the Israeli Army from the village of Umm al-Fahm, which isn’t in the West Bank but inside Israel. This drove home the fact that, even as Israeli citizens, Palestinians are treated as inferior, as basically a sort of underclass existing in a condition of apartheid.

At the same time, because Israel does not have a constitution either, and because the ultra-Orthodox parties are acquiring more and more political power, there are Israeli Jewish groups and individuals who have begun to organize around the notion of a full secular democracy for all Israeli citizens. The charismatic Azmi Bishara, an Arab member of the Knesset, has also been speaking about enlarging the concept of citizenship as a way to get beyond ethnic and religious criteria that now make Israel in effect an undemocratic state for 20 percent of its population.

In the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, the situation is deeply unstable and exploitative. Protected by the army, Israeli settlers (almost 350,000 of them) live as extraterritorial, privileged people with rights that resident Palestinians do not have. (For example, West Bank Palestinians cannot go to Jerusalem and in 70 percent of the territory are still subject to Israeli military law, with their land available for confiscation.) Israel controls Palestinian water resources and security, as well as exits and entrances. Even the new Gaza airport is under Israeli security control. You don’t need to be an expert to see that this is a prescription for extending, not limiting, conflict. Here the truth must be faced, not avoided or denied.

There are Israeli Jews today who speak candidly about ”post-Zionism,” insofar as after 50 years of Israeli history, classic Zionism has neither provided a solution to the Palestinian presence nor an exclusively Jewish presence. I see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal rights for each citizen. There can be no reconciliation unless both peoples, two communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and that it has to be dealt with as such.

This does not mean a diminishing of Jewish life as Jewish life or a surrendering of Palestinian Arab aspirations and political existence. On the contrary, it means self-determination for both peoples. But it does mean being willing to soften, lessen and finally give up special status for one people at the expense of the other. The Law of Return for Jews and the right of return for Palestinian refugees have to be considered and trimmed together. Both the notions of Greater Israel as the land of the Jewish people given to them by God and of Palestine as an Arab land that cannot be alienated from the Arab homeland need to be reduced in scale and exclusivity.

Interestingly, the millennia-long history of Palestine provides at least two precedents for thinking in such secular and modest terms. First, Palestine is and has always been a land of many histories; it is a radical simplification to think of it as principally or exclusively Jewish or Arab. While the Jewish presence is longstanding, it is by no means the main one. Other tenants have included Canaanites, Moabites, Jebusites and Philistines in ancient times, and Romans, Ottomans, Byzantines and Crusaders in the modern ages. Palestine is multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious. There is as little historical justification for homogeneity as there is for notions of national or ethnic and religious purity today.

Second, during the interwar period, a small but important group of Jewish thinkers (Judah Magnes, Buber, Arendt and others) argued and agitated for a binational state. The logic of Zionism naturally overwhelmed their efforts, but the idea is alive today here and there among Jewish and Arab individuals frustrated with the evident insufficiencies and depredations of the present. The essence of their vision is coexistence and sharing in ways that require an innovative, daring and theoretical willingness to get beyond the arid stalemate of assertion and rejection. Once the initial acknowledgment of the other as an equal is made, I believe the way forward becomes not only possible but also attractive.

The initial step, however, is a very difficult one to take. Israeli Jews are insulated from the Palestinian reality; most of them say that it does not really concern them. I remember the first time I drove from Ramallah into Israel, thinking it was like going straight from Bangladesh into Southern California. Yet reality is never that neat.

My generation of Palestinians, still reeling from the shock of losing everything in 1948, find it nearly impossible to accept that their homes and farms were taken over by another people. I see no way of evading the fact that in 1948 one people displaced another, thereby committing a grave injustice. Reading Palestinian and Jewish history together not only gives the tragedies of the Holocaust and of what subsequently happened to the Palestinians their full force but also reveals how in the course of interrelated Israeli and Palestinian life since 1948, one people, the Palestinians, has borne a disproportional share of the pain and loss.

Religious and right-wing Israelis and their supporters have no problem with such a formulation. Yes, they say, we won, but that’s how it should be. This land is the land of Israel, not of anyone else. I heard those words from an Israeli soldier guarding a bulldozer that was destroying a West Bank Palestinian’s field (its owner helplessly watching) to expand a bypass road.

But they are not the only Israelis. For others, who want peace as a result of reconciliation, there is dissatisfaction with the religious parties’ increasing hold on Israeli life and Oslo’s unfairness and frustrations. Many such Israelis demonstrate against their Government’s Palestinian land expropriations and house demolitions. So you sense a healthy willingness to look elsewhere for peace than in land-grabbing and suicide bombs.

For some Palestinians, because they are the weaker party, the losers, giving up on a full restoration of Arab Palestine is giving up on their own history. Most others, however, especially my children’s generation, are skeptical of their elders and look more unconventionally toward the future, beyond conflict and unending loss. Obviously, the establishments in both communities are too tied to present ”pragmatic” currents of thought and political formations to venture anything more risky, but a few others (Palestinian and Israeli) have begun to formulate radical alternatives to the status quo. They refuse to accept the limitations of Oslo, what one Israeli scholar has called ”peace without Palestinians,” while others tell me that the real struggle is over equal rights for Arabs and Jews, not a separate, necessarily dependent and weak Palestinian entity.

The beginning is to develop something entirely missing from both Israeli and Palestinian realities today: the idea and practice of citizenship, not of ethnic or racial community, as the main vehicle for coexistence. In a modern state, all its members are citizens by virtue of their presence and the sharing of rights and responsibilities. Citizenship therefore entitles an Israeli Jew and a Palestinian Arab to the same privileges and resources. A constitution and a bill of rights thus become necessary for getting beyond Square 1 of the conflict because each group would have the same right to self-determination; that is, the right to practice communal life in its own (Jewish or Palestinian) way, perhaps in federated cantons, with a joint capital in Jerusalem, equal access to land and inalienable secular and juridical rights. Neither side should be held hostage to religious extremists.

Yet feelings of persecution, suffering and victimhood are so ingrained that it is nearly impossible to undertake political initiatives that hold Jews and Arabs to the same general principles of civil equality while avoiding the pitfall of us-versus-them. Palestinian intellectuals need to express their case directly to Israelis, in public forums, universities and the media. The challenge is both to and within civil society, which has long been subordinate to a nationalism that has developed into an obstacle to reconciliation. Moreover, the degradation of discourse — symbolized by Arafat and Netanyahu trading charges while Palestinian rights are compromised by exaggerated “security” concerns — impedes any wider, more generous perspective from emerging.

The alternatives are unpleasantly simple: either the war continues (along with the onerous cost of the current peace process) or a way out, based on peace and equality (as in South Africa after apartheid) is actively sought, despite the many obstacles. Once we grant that Palestinians and Israelis are there to stay, then the decent conclusion has to be the need for peaceful coexistence and genuine reconciliation. Real self-determination. Unfortunately, injustice and belligerence don’t diminish by themselves: they have to be attacked by all concerned.